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ABSTRACT
Bringer et al. proposed two cryptographic protocols for the computation of Hamming distance. Their first scheme uses
Oblivious Transfer and provides security in the semi-honest model. The other scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer
and is claimed to provide full security in the malicious case. The proposed protocols have direct implications to biometric
authentication schemes between a prover and a verifier where the verifier has biometric data of the users in plain form.
In this paper, we show that their protocol is not actually fully secure against malicious adversaries. More precisely, our
attack breaks the soundness property of their protocol where a malicious user can compute a Hamming distance which is
different from the actual value. For biometric authentication systems, this attack allows a malicious adversary to pass the
authentication without knowledge of the honest user’s input with at most O(n) complexity instead of O(2n), where n is
the input length. We propose an enhanced version of their protocol where this attack is eliminated. The security of our
modified protocol is proven using the simulation-based paradigm. Furthermore, as for efficiency concerns, the modified
protocol utilizes Verifiable Oblivious Transfer which does not require the commitments to outputs which improves its
efficiency significantly.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, several commercial organizations have invested
in secure electronic authentication systems to reliably
verify identity of individuals. Biometric authentication
systems are receiving a lot of public attention and
becoming a crucial solution to many authentication and
identity management problems because of cost-effective
improvements in sensor technologies and in efficiency of
matching algorithms [1]. Biometric data (i.e. templates)
of a user is inherently unique. This uniqueness provides
assurance to individuals to be securely authenticated for
accessing an environment provided that the biometric data
is kept as a secret. The biometric data cannot be directly
used with conventional encryption techniques because the
data itself is inherently noisy [2]. Namely, whenever two
samples of data are extracted from the same fingerprint,
they will not be exactly the same. In this context, in order
to eliminate the noisy nature of the biometric templates,
several error correction techniques were proposed in the
literature [3, 4, 5].
Biometric authentication over an insecure network
raises more security and privacy issues. The primary
security issue is the protection of the plain biometric
templates against a malicious adversary because they
cannot be replaced with new ones, once they are
compromised. The common biometric authentication
system is as follows: For each user, the biometric template
is stored in a database during the enrollment phase. In
the verification phase a new fresh acquisition of a user is
compared to the template of the same individual stored
in the database. The verification phase can either be
processed within a smart card (i.e, on-card matching), or
in a system outside the card (i.e, off-card matching) [6].
Since the biometric template is not necessarily transferred
to outside environment, the on-card matching technique
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protects the template. In both techniques, authentication
protocols should not expose the biometric template without
the user’s agreement. In order to ensure privacy of the user,
the biometric template should be stored in an encrypted
form in a database and no one, including the server, can
learn any information on the biometric data in plain form.
But still, it should be possible to verify whether a user is
authentic [7].
In order to thwart the security and privacy issues
described above for biometric authentication several
matching algorithms are proposed in the literature.
Many of them utilize the computation of the Hamming
distance of two binary biometric templates. Note that
the Hamming distance does not reveal any significant
information to any polynomially bounded adversary.
In this context, Workshop on Applied Homomorphic
Cryptography (WAHC 13) (co-located with Financial
Cryptography 2013), Bringer et al. [8] proposed two
secure Hamming distance computation schemes based on
Oblivious Transfer. In their proposals, the authors integrate
the advantages of both biometrics and cryptography in
order to improve the overall security and privacy of an
authentication system. The first scheme is solely based
on 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) and it achieves full
security in the semi-honest setting, and one-sided security
in the malicious setting. One can of course use one of the
efficient OT protocols for the semi-honest setting [9, 10].
The second scheme uses Committed Oblivious Transfer
(COT) and is claimed to provide full security against
malicious adversaries. Since the protocol of Bringer et al.
computes Hamming distance of bit strings, the authors
utilizes the only COT protocol of bit strings that is due to
Kiraz et al. [11].
1.1. Contributions
In this paper, we first revisit the Hamming distance
computation protocol SHADE of Bringer et al. [8]. [12]
generalizes and proposes improvements over [8] in the
semi-honest setting. We show that SHADE is in fact not
sound in the malicious model. More precisely, we show
that the full scheme has a weakness allowing any malicious
adversary to violate soundness property of the protocol,
i.e., a different value of Hamming distance from the actual
one.
The protocol flaw resides in the method used for
validation of the inputs of a user. Using zero-knowledge
proofs, the protocol aims to force the user to submit valid
inputs, i.e. pairs of integers (x, y) that differ by 1. The
method succeeds at checking the difference, however, it
fails at validation of the pairs, i.e. a malicious party can
submit bogus pairs (x˜, y˜) and can pass the verification
steps without being detected. Since SHADE computes the
Hamming distance by using the outputs of COT, a verifier
would compute an incorrect Hamming distance. We would
like to highlight that any fake Hamming distance can
be set in advance. As a practical example for biometric
authentication, we show that a malicious adversary can
pass the authentication by running the algorithm at most
O(n) times (instead of running O(2n) times, where n is
the input length.). Last but not least, an adversary with
knowledge of the distribution of inputs can mount a more
powerful attack. Note that this attack is of independent
interest and may be applied to other schemes.
In order to eliminate this weakness, we propose a new
method for input validation. This way, we remove the fault
in the protocol and enhance the security of it. We also show
that the computational complexity of the fixed protocol
is comparable with the insecure protocol. Moreover, we
optimize the new input validation method for biometric
authentication systems. We prove the security of our
protocol using the ideal/real simulation paradigm in the
standard model [13, 14, 15] and [16].
Lastly, we consider the efficiency of the protocol
and show that running a COT is not necessary in the
full scheme of the protocol. We show that VOT is
sufficient instead of using complete COT protocol which
contains additional commitments and zero-knowledge
proofs [17]. This leads to a considerable improvement in
the computational complexity of the protocol.
1.2. Organization
Section 2 gives related work on the computation of
Hamming distance and biometric authentication systems.
Section 3 provides security and privacy model for
biometric authentication protocols. Section 4 reviews the
two schemes in the protocol, the basic scheme which
uses OTs and the full scheme based on COT of bit-
strings. In Section 5, we present an attack on the full
scheme of Bringer et al. which breaks the soundness
property. In Section 6, we propose a security fix and
discuss the efficiency of their protocol in the malicious
model. Here, we show that VOT is sufficient instead of
COT. In Section 7 we prove our fixed protocol using the
simulation-based paradigm. The complexity analysis of the
proposed protocol is shown in Section 8. Finally, Section 9
concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
There has been a large amount of research done on the
security and efficiency of the biometric authentication
systems. In this section, we review the most recent works
for biometric authentication.
Hamming distance together with Oblivious Transfers
is one of the most elegant tools used in biometric
authentication systems. For example, Jarrous and Pinkas
propose the binHDOT protocol [18] to compute Hamming
distance based on 1-out-of-2 Committed Oblivious
Transfer with Constant Difference (COTCD) of Jarecki
and Shmatikov [19] and Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation
(OPE) of Hazay and Lindell [20]. The protocol also uses
commitments and zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee that
each party follows the protocol. This protocol provides full
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security in the malicious model. One OPE protocol and n
COTCDs are invoked to compute the Hamming distance
between two strings of n bits.
The SCiFI (Secure Computation of Face Recognition)
of Osadchy et al. is the first secure face identification
system which is well suited for real-life applications
[21]. SCiFI system consists of two parts: a client and a
server. The server prepares a face recognition database that
contains representations of face images. This computation
is done offline. In the verification phase, a client prepares
her face representation and then a cryptographic protocol
which uses Paillier encryption and Oblivious Transfer
running between the server and the client. The authors
implemented a complete SCiFI system in which a face is
represented with a string of 900 bits. The authors designed
the system by aiming the minimal online overhead: the
most significant requirement for computing Hamming
distance between this length of bit strings is 8 invocations
of 1-out-of-2 OTs.
Bringer et al. [22] used biometric authentica-
tion/identification for access control. Note that it is
important to securely store the biometric template on
the server and using conventional encryption schemes
for securing the biometric template can provide a strong
protection. Note also that conventional cryptography
requires an exact match while biometrics always have a
threshold value, therefore biometric authentication over
the encrypted domain is a challenging task. In [22], a
cryptographic scheme is given for biometric identification
over an encrypted domain which uses Bloom Filters
with Storage and Locality-Sensitive Hashing. Their
paper is interesting because it proposes the first biometric
authentication/identification scheme over encrypted binary
templates which is stored in the server’s database.
In another paper, Bringer et al. [23] proposed
a security model for biometric-based authentication
protocols, relying on the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem
[24]. This system allows the biometric match to be
performed in the encrypted domain in such a way that the
server cannot identify which user is authenticating. The
proposed system requires storage of biometric templates
in plain form. In order to protect the privacy, the system
ensures that the biometric feature stored in the database
cannot be explicitly linked to any identity, but the DB only
verifies whether the received data belongs to an identity in
the database.
Erkin et al. [25] propose a privacy preserving face
recognition system on encrypted messages which is based
on the standard Eigenface recognition system [26]. In
their protocol design, they utilized semantically secure
Paillier homomorphic public-key encryption schemes and
Damgård, Geisler and Krøigaard (DGK) cryptosystem
[27, 28]. Later, Sadeghi et al. make an improvement
over the efficiency of this system [29] by merging
the eigenface recognition algorithm using homomorphic
encryption and Yao’s garbled circuits. Their protocol
improves the scheme proposed by Erkin et al. significantly
since it has only a constant number of rounds and most of
the computation and communication is performed during
the pre-computation phase. Schneider and Zohner [30]
provide an improvement over [29] and [21] by using the
GMW protocol [31].
Tuyls et al. [32] propose a template protection scheme
for fingerprint based authentication in order to protect
biometric data. During the enrollment phase, client’s
biometric features X is extracted, the Helper Data [33]
W is computed (that is required by the error-correction
mechanism), a one-way hash functionH is applied to S and
the data (client, W, H(S)) is stored on the server. Here, S
is a randomly chosen secret value such that G(X, W)=S for
a shielding function G [34]. During the verification phase,
after client’s noisy biometric dataX is extracted, the server
sends W back to the sensor. The sensor computes S =
G(X ,W) and H(S). Then, the server compares H(S) with
H(S), and grants access if the results are equal. The Helper
Data is sent over the public channel, i.e. an adversary may
obtain W. Tuyls et al. however designed the system in
such a way that the adversary obtains minimal information
about X by capturing W.
Kulkarni et al. [35] propose a biometric authentication
scheme based on Iris Matching. Their scheme uses the
somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme of Boneh et
al. [36] which allows an arbitrary number of additions of
ciphertexts but supports only one multiplication operation
between the ciphertexts. The scheme is based on Paillier
encryption and bilinear pairings. This scheme consists
of two phases: Enrollment phase and Verification phase.
During the Enrollment phase, necessary keys are first
generated by the server and then sent to the client securely.
Secondly, the client’s biometric data is XORed with the
key, and a mask value is XORed with a mask key.
Both XORed values are sent to the server. During the
Verification (authentication) phase, the client sends an
encryption of the authenticated biometric data to compute
the distance. The protocol is proven to be secure in the
semi-honest model.
Kerschbaum et al. [37] propose an authentication
scheme in a different setting. In particular, they assume that
there are two parties where each of them has a fingerprint
template. They would like to learn whether the templates
match, i.e. generated from the same fingerprint. However,
they do not want to reveal the templates if there is no
match. Their protocol is secure only in the semi-honest
model using secure multi-party computation as a building
block.
Barni et al. propose a privacy preserving authentication
scheme for finger-code templates by using homomorphic
encryption which is secure only in the semi-honest model
[38, 39]. Their protocol allows the use of the Euclidean
distances to compare fingerprints in such a way that
the biometric data is reduced for computing a smaller
encrypted value that is sent to the server.
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3. SECURITY AND PRIVACY MODEL
We adopt the standard simulation-based definition of
ideal/real security paradigm in the standard model which
is already highlighted in [13, 14, 15] and [16]. In
simulation-based security, the view of a protocol execution
in a real setting is compared (a statistical/computational
indistinguishable manner) as if the computation is
executed in an ideal setting where the parties send inputs
to an ideal functionality F = (F1,F2) that performs the
computation and returns its result.
In an ideal setting, the parties send their inputs x and y
to an ideal functionality F who computes F(x, y) (which
is the output of the Hamming distance in our setting) and
sendsF1(x, y) to the first party andF2(x, y) to the second
party (F1(x, y) or F2(x, y) can be ⊥ if only one party is
required to learn the output). Note that the adversary, who
controls one of the parties, can choose to send any input
to the functionality F , while the honest party always sends
its specified input. In a real execution of a protocol ΠF
for a functionality F , one of the parties is assumed to be
corrupted under the complete control of an adversary A.
Note that we assume that the adversary A corrupts one of
the two parties at the beginning of the protocol execution
and is fixed throughout the computation (as it is known as
static adversary model).
Informally, a protocol ΠF is secure if for every real-
model adversary A interacting with an honest party
running the protocol, there exists an ideal-model adversary
S interacting with the trusted party computing f , such that
the output of the adversary and the honest party in the
real model is computationally indistinguishable from the
output of simulator and the honest party in the ideal model.
More formally,
Definition 3.1
(Simulation-based security) Let F and the protocol ΠF
be as above. We say that the protocol ΠF securely
computes the ideal functionality F if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time real-world adversary A, there exists a
probabilistic polynomial-time an ideal-model adversary S
(called the simulator) such that
REALΠF ,A(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y| ≈ IDEALF,S(x, y)x,y s.t. |x|=|y|
Note that the above definition implies that the parties
already know the input lengths (by the requirement that |x|
= |y|).
Note also that VOT and COT protocols are used as
subprotocols. In [40, 41], it is shown that it is sufficient
to analyze the security of a protocol in a hybrid model
in which the parties interact with each other and assumed
to have access to a trusted third party that computes a
VOT (resp. COT) protocol for them. Thus, in the security
analysis of our protocol the simulator plays the role of the
trusted third party for VOT (resp. COT) functionality when
simulating the corrupted party. Roughly speaking, in the
hybrid model, parties run an arbitrary protocol like in the
real model, but have access to a trusted third party that
computes a functionality (in our case VOT or COT) like
in the ideal model. A protocol is secure if any attack on the
real model can be carried out in the hybrid model.
4. THE BASIC AND THE FULL SCHEME
OF BRINGER ET AL.
In this section, we briefly describe the basic and the full
scheme of [8] used for computation of Hamming distance
between two bit strings. The basic scheme uses oblivious
transfer (OT) and provides full security when the parties
are semi-honest and one-sided security in the malicious
model. The full scheme uses committed oblivious transfer
(COT) [11] and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge [17]
to compute the Hamming distance in malicious model.
Each scheme has two options to select the party which
computes and outputs the result meaning that each party
may act as a server and the other as a client.
4.1. The Basic Scheme
The basic scheme is designed to provide secure and
efficient method for computing the Hamming distance
between two bit strings in semi-honest model. The
intuition behind this protocol is that if both parties are
semi-honest, the OT protocols are sufficient to preserve
privacy.
The basic scheme in [8] which is secure against semi-
honest adversaries is as follows:
Two parties P1 and P2 are willing to compute
the Hamming distance of their private inputs X =
{x1, . . . , xn} and Y = {y1, . . . , yn}, respectively. At the
first step, P1 randomly picks r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zn+1 and
computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri. For i = 1, · · · , n, the parties run an
OT protocol in which P1 acts as the sender and P2 acts as
the receiver. More precisely, P1 inputs (ri + xi, ri + x˜i)
where x˜i = 1− xi and P2 inputs yi. At the end of the
OT protocol, P2 receives ti = (ri + xi) if yi = 0 and
(ti = ri + x˜i) otherwise. Next, P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti.
In the last step,
• 1st Option: P2 sends T to P1. Next, P1 outputs
T −R.
• 2nd Option: P1 sends R to P2. Next, P2 outputs
T −R.
The privacy is still guaranteed in the presence of semi-
honest adversaries as they proved in Section 6 of [8].
Furthermore, the efficiency of the basic scheme of Bringer
et al. [8] was further improved in [12]. The authors also
mention that the basic scheme can be optimized by using
the state of the art techniques, i.e. extended oblivious
transfer, as first proposed by Ishai et al. in [42] and later
improved in [43]. This technique leads to an efficient
construction which extends k OTs to n OTs (k < n)
in the random oracle model that is secure against only
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semi-honest adversaries (note that hash functions can be
replaced with RO model in the real case).
4.2. The Full Scheme
The full scheme of Bringer et al. considers the case where
the parties are assumed to be malicious. Note that running
OT protocol does not prevent a party from modifying her
input. Secondly, the receiver may send a different value
than the actual OT output that she computes. In order to
prevent such scenarios, the authors propose to use the 1-
out-of-2 Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) protocol of
Kiraz et al. presented in [11] (see Figure 1). Though, in
Section 5, we show that the idea of input validation for P1
is not sufficient and can be exploited with success.
Before we proceed, let’s continue with the description
of the full scheme (refer to [8] for more details).
• At the first step of the protocol, P2 commits to her
input bits yi’s and proves in zero-knowledge [17]
that each yi is either equal to 0 or equal to 1.
• At the same time, P1 generates random elements
ri’s from the plaintext space of the commitment
scheme and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri. Next, she
commits to ai and bi where (ai, bi) = (ri +
xi, ri + x˜i)
∗. Let’s denote Commit(M) for the
commitment functionality of a message M †.
P1 publishes the commitments Ai = Commit(ai)
and Bi = Commit(bi). Furthermore, using these
commitments she proves that ai and bi differ by 1
for each i.
• Next, the COT protocol is run for each i. At the end
of each COT, P2 receives ti = ri + (xi ⊕ yi) and
both parties receive Ci = Commit(ti). When all
the COTs are run, P2 computes the sum T =
n∑
i=1
ti.
• At this point, there are two options:
– 1st Option: P2 computes C = C1 · · ·Cn,
and because of the underlying homomorphic
property we have Commit(T ) = C [8]. P2
sends T to P1 and proves in zero-knowledge
that C indeed commits to T . P1 also
computes C = C1 · · ·Cn and verifies the
proof. If all verifications are successful, P1
outputs T −R.
– 2nd Option: P1 computes K =
Commit(2R + n) = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn.
P1 sends R to P2 and proves
in zero-knowledge that K indeed
commits to 2R + n. P2 computes
∗The commit functionality of [11] is basically a (2,2)-threshold homomorphic
encryption scheme (e.g., ElGamal [44], Paillier [45]). Let (pkP1,P2 , (skP1 ,
skP2 )) denote public and private key pairs of the encryption scheme where
pkP1,P2 is the common public key, and skP1 , skP2 are the corresponding
private key shares of P1 and P2 , respectively.
†Note that because of the underlying encryption scheme Commit includes
randomness and public key, and we hide them for the sake of simplicity.
K = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn and verifies that
K = Commit(2R + n). If all verifications
are successful, P2 outputs T −R.
The authors in [8] claim that the above scheme is fully
secure against malicious adversaries. However, in the next
section we show that a malicious P1 can easily break the
soundness property of the scheme.
5. SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY
ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL BY
BRINGER ET AL.
We are now ready to describe the protocol flaw of the full
scheme in detail. The security flaw is due to the proof for
validation of P1’s input bits. The flaw allows a malicious
P1 to change the Hamming distance between her input and
P2’s input. In the next section, we propose a solution to fix
the flaw by designing a new proof for validation. We show
that the complexity of the new proof for the validation
of P1’s input bits for biometric authentication systems is
significantly reduced.
Furthermore, we also analyze the protocol from the
efficiency perspective and show that the complexity of the
protocol can be significantly improved. COT protocol is
basically designed as a sub-protocol in order to prevent
possible malicious behaviors between sender and receiver,
where the committed output of COT is expected to
be used in further parts of the system. However, the
committed outputs of COT are not used in the case that
P1 computes the Hamming distance. Hence, we point
out that Verifiable Oblivious Transfer is sufficient in
the case that P1 computes the Hamming distance. This
eliminates to compute n commitments together with the
zero-knowledge proofs (for each run of COT protocol). In
this way, we improves the efficiency of the protocol by
using VOT instead of COT when P1 is the server.
5.1. Attack to the Full Scheme
The protocol is not sound in the case where P1 is
malicious. This is because P1 is free in the sense that she
can commit to any pair such that the absolute value of
the difference of the encrypted values is 1, i.e. P1 proves
that |bi − ai| = 1 where the pair (ai, bi) is supposed to be
(ri + xi, ri + x˜i). However, a malicious P1 may choose
invalid pairs in a special way together with the proofs
that difference between each pair is equal to 1. Our attack
uses the fact that at the end of each COT, P2 receives
either ti = ri + g or ti = ri + h and computes the sum
T =
n∑
i=1
ti, where g, h are within the finite cyclic group.
Note that g is expected to be equal to xi and h to x˜i.
However, with a careful choosing of g’s and h’s, some
g’s can be neutralized by some h’s in this sum. Hence, the
soundness property of the protocol can be violated. In fact,
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Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output:⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
COT←→
Common Output: CommitC(xy)
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Figure 1. Committed Oblivious Transfer
the security proof of [8] does not explicitly use the zero-
knowledge proof of the statement leading to the flaw in
their security analysis.
Before we describe the attack it is important to
highlight that the underlying COT scheme uses threshold
ElGamal encryption as a commitment mechanism, i.e.
Commit(xi) = Enc(xi) where xi ∈ G where G is a large
finite cyclic group (of a prime order) [11]. This guarantees
the existence of the inverse of n.
Without loss of generality assume that #0’s in P2’s
input Y is ` (i.e., #1’s in Y is n− `). A predetermined
fake Hamming distance can be computed with the
knowledge of #0’s (similarly #1’s) in P2 as follows:
a malicious P1 uses (ai, bi) = (ri + g, ri + h) for an
arbitrary Hamming distance HD = `g + (n− `)h such that
g − h = 1, where g, h are the group elements. Then,
HD = `g + (n− `)(g − 1) = ng − n + `.
For an example, if a malicious P1 desires Hamming
distance HD to be 0 then she chooses g = 1− `n−1.
Next, h= g-1= -`n−1. Hence, P1 may use (ai, bi)=(ri +
(1− `n−1), ri − `n−1) as input. To be more concrete, the
attack is given as follows:
• P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each
yi is either 0 or 1. P1 then generates random ri’s
and computes R=
n∑
i=1
ri.
• Next, instead of following the protocol, P1
computes (ai, bi)=(ri + (1− `n−1), ri − `n−1)
and publishes Ai = Commit(ai) and
Bi = Commit(bi). Note that for each i,
|bi − ai| = 1 and hence, the proofs pass
successfully.
• At the end of each COT, P2 receives either ti =
ri + (1− `n−1) or ti = ri − `n−1. After COTs
are run, P2 computes the sum
T =
n∑
i=1
ti
=
∑
i|yi=0
(
ri + (1− `n−1)
)
+
∑
i|yi=1
(
ri − `n−1
)
= `(1− `n−1) + (n− `)(−`n−1) +
n∑
i=1
ri
=
n∑
i=1
ri
= R.
Therefore, the Hamming distance dH(X,Y )=T −R is
equal to 0. We stress that the weakness in the scheme
is destructive as we prove that a relatively insignificant
information leakage causes computation of a completely
inaccurate result. Namely, without knowledge of the real
X , P1 fools P2 into outputting an incorrect Hamming
distance value without being detected. Furthermore, a
malicious P1 with the prior knowledge of ` is capable of
manipulating HD by computing the values g and h using
the above-mentioned equation. This is interesting because
Hamming distance is not necessarily equal to 0 or 1. For
example, in [46], the authors propose a privacy-preserving
protocol for iris-based authentication using Yao’s garbled
circuits. They show that Hamming distance between two
iris codes owned by the same person is rarely close to 0
(and similarly it is rarely close to n for different persons).
Therefore, the scalability feature of our attack can be easily
adopted to various general settings.
In this part, we propose the most general case and in
the next section we give a practical attack for biometric
authentication schemes reducing the computational com-
plexity of an attacker from O(2n) to O(n), where n is
the input length. Namely, an attacker without any prior
knowledge can authenticate herself using only n trials
instead of 2n.
5.2. A Special Case: Apply the Attack to
Biometric Authentication Systems
In the previous section, we described the most general
case, i.e., for any system that uses the proposed Hamming
distance protocol. We now apply the proposed attack as
a practical example on biometric authentication systems
with full success. Note that the matching procedure
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for fingerprint, palm print or iris actually measures the
Hamming distance between the two bit-strings X and
Y that encode the biometric sample and template (e.g.,
[7, 47, 35]).
The attack basically consists of n runs of the proposed
attack method to successfully authenticate to the system,
where n is the input length. In general, for an n-bit string
Y = (y1, . . . , yn), an attacker must roughly try 2n search
for X to pass the authentication successfully and it is
infeasible for large n. However, using the proposed attack
a corrupted P1 i can authenticate the system after at most
n trials (because the number of 0s or 1s in Y is between 0
and n, i.e., 0 ≤ ` ≤ n). More precisely, starting ` = 1 until
` = n a corrupted P1 runs the proposed attack method, and
because 0 ≤ ` ≤ n the authentication is successful with at
most n trials (without any knowledge of the real input X).
5.3. Apply the Attack for Uniformly Distributed
Inputs
This attack can also be directly applied to uniformly
distributed bit strings X and Y . In this scenario the input
bit-strings of P2 (which is generated from a biometric
template) is expected to be independent and identically
distributed. That is, there are nearly equal number of zeros
and ones in an input bit string. Below, we show that this
fact easily allows an adversary to minimize the Hamming
distance and successfully deceive a verifier:
1. P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each
yi is either 0 or 1.
2. P1 picks random ri’s and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3. Instead of computing (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + x˜i),
P1 computes (ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1)
in order to make the commitments Ai =
CommitP1,i(ai) and Bi = CommitP1,i(bi).
The authors in [8] uses homomorphic encryption
as the commitment mechanism. Since those
cryptosystems work in a group of prime order, the
multiplicative inverse of 2 always exists, i.e. P1 can
commit to (ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1). Next
P1 proves that |bi − ai| = 1 which always holds.
Note that P1 does not prove the validity of her
input, i.e, she does not prove that the xi’s are equal
to either 0 or 1.
4. COTs are run, and in one half of the COTs (because
of the uniform distributed inputs), P2 receives
ti=ri − 2−1 and ti = ri + 2−1 in the other half.
5. P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti. Since yi’s are equally
distributed, i.e. the numbers of 0s and 1s in
{y1, . . . , yn} are nearly equal, P2 computes
T =
(∑
i
ri + 2
−1
)
+
(∑
i
ri − 2−1
)
=
n∑
i=1
ri = R± k2−1 for some small k  n.
6. Using the 2nd option, K = CommitP2,i(2R +
n) = A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn.
7. P1 sends R and the proof that K commits to 2R +
n to P2.
8. P2 computes dH(X,Y ) = T −R = k where k  n
and successfully authenticates P1 since k will be
less than the threshold value.
5.4. Our Solution for the Attack
The weakness of the full scheme is due to the zero-
knowledge proof of a wrong statement used for validation
of the input pairs {(ai, bi),∀i = 1, . . . , n}. A malicious
P1 can easily exploit this weakness as described in the
previous section. Therefore, logical statements of zero-
knowledge proofs should be carefully checked against
these kinds of adversarial behaviors.
As a security fix, we modify the step in which P1 gen-
erates random ri values. Namely, after generating each ri,
P1 computes and publishesAi = Commit(ri + xi), Bi =
Commit(ri + x˜i) and Ri = Commit(ri). Next, P1 sends
the zero-knowledge proof of the following statement
((ai − ri) = 0 ∨ (bi − ri) = 0) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
that is equivalent to
(ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧ |bi − ai| = 1
using the commitmentsAi, Bi andRi. This new statement
contains one more relation than the one in the original
proof of [8]. Although the computation cost of the protocol
is slightly increased, the validation process now assures the
security of the protocol.
Note that if the new statement (ai + bi − 2ri = 1) ∧
|bi − ai| = 1 is true then only one of the following two
cases can occur:
ai = bi + 1⇒ 2bi + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ bi = ri, ai = ri + 1
bi = ai + 1⇒ 2ai + 1− 2ri = 1⇒ ai = ri, bi = ri + 1
In Section 7 we provide the security analysis of the
improved scheme.
5.4.1. More Efficient Solution for Biometric
Authentication
Biometric authentication systems are designed to
tolerate a small level of errors. In general, the measure
process is not perfect in most environments and thus,
instead of exact match, a biometric system authenticates
a party that matches with a small error to prevent false
negatives.
The authentication process must also have a small
complexity to compute the result in the fastest way.
Therefore each party must prove nothing more than the
necessary and sufficient data for validation of her input.
These motivations lead us to design a more efficient
proof that can be used in the biometric authentication
systems. Namely, after generating and publishing the
commitments to ai, bi, ri as in the previous section, P1
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sends the proof of:
ai + bi − 2ri = 1.
The above relation has a smaller complexity than |bi −
ai| = 1 while it still provides higher security. This input
validation method is an efficient solution for our attack in
the case of biometric authentication. Note that an adversary
may input (ai, bi) = (ri − 2−1, ri + 2−1) and pass the
validation but its Hamming distance is n
2
which is the
expected value of Hamming distance between two random
inputs with length n.
5.5. Efficiency Enhancements
In this section, we present some improvements for
the efficiency of the protocol. First, we reduce the
computational complexity of the protocol using VOT
instead of COT without sacrificing the security. Namely,
COT is not necessary in the case where P2 computes the
final Hamming distance. Next we reduce the complexity
of the proof for the validity of P1’s inputs in the case of
biometric authentication.
5.5.1. COT versus VOT
Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (like COT) [48] is also
a natural combination of
(
2
1
)
-OT and commitments. Let
CommitS and CommitC be commitments by Sender and
Chooser respectively. In a VOT protocol, the Sender
has (x0, x1), the Chooser has y ∈ {0, 1} and the
commitments CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y) are
common input. At the end of the protocol the Chooser
learns xy and the sender has no output. Note that the
difference with COT is that commitment to the output xy
is not computed, i.e., VOT is defined if the CommitC(xy)
is not required as output. The functionality of VOT is
illustrated in Figure 2.
We note here the two main aspects of COT vs. VOT:
What to transfer
{
bits x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}
strings x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1}k
Committed Output
{
yes→ COT
no → VOT
We show that the basic protocol in [8] does not have
to use COT in the case that the server computes the result
(i.e., VOT is already sufficient because it is not necessary
to compute the final commitment.).
5.5.2. Efficiency Improvement Using VOT
In this section, we point out a computational complexity
reduction. Note that COT is run for the malicious case in
[8]. COT requires the receiver to obtain the output together
with its commitment to this value. In the beginning of
the protocol, the input of P1 is an n-bit string X =
(x1, . . . , xn) and the input of P2 is an n-bit string Y =
(y1, . . . , yn). After running the protocol there are two
options:
• P1 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and
P2 obtains nothing
• P2 obtains the Hamming distance dH(X,Y ) and
P1 obtains nothing
In case P2 computes the Hamming distance, the
committed values from the output of COT is not used.
In such case, these commitments are not necessary to
be computed, and therefore VOT is sufficient to use. We
realized this observation after writing the COT protocol
explicitly with the overall protocol instead of using as a
black box. If P1 computes the Hamming distance COT is
still necessary to use.
6. OUR FIXED AND IMPROVED
SCHEME
We made the modifications to the full scheme of [8] in
order to fix the security weakness described in Section 5
and improve the efficiency of the protocol as mentioned in
Section 5.5. Now, we give the corrected scheme with all
details:
Inputs:
• P1 inputs an n-bit string X = (x1, . . . , xn)
• P2 inputs an n-bit string Y = (y1, . . . , yn)
Outputs:
• 1st Option: P1 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P2 obtains
nothing
• 2nd Option: P2 obtains dH(X,Y ) and P1 obtains
nothing
Protocol:
1. P2 commits to her inputs yi’s and proves that each
of yi is either 0 or 1.
2. P1 generates random ri’s from the plaintext space
of Commit and computes R =
n∑
i=1
ri.
3. P1 commits to (ai, bi, ri) = (ri + xi, ri + x˜i, ri).
P1 publishes Ai = Commit(ai), Bi =
Commit(bi) and Ri = Commit(ri).
4. P1 proves that (|ai − ri| = 0 ∨ |bi − ri| = 0) ∧
|bi − ai| = 1 using Ai, Bi and Ri.
5. For each i = 1, . . . , n, a COT is run where
• P1 acts as the sender and P2 as the receiver.
• P2’s selection bit is yi.
• P1’s input bit is (ai, bi).
• The output obtained by P2 is ti = ri + (xi ⊕
yi).
• Both parties obtain Ci = Commit(ti).
6. P2 computes T =
n∑
i=1
ti
7. 1st Option: Run VOT
(a) P1 computes K = Commit(2R + n) =
A1 · · ·An ·B1 · · ·Bn.
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Sender
Private Input: x0, x1
Private Output:⊥
Common Input:
CommitS(x0), CommitS(x1),CommitC(y)
VOT←→
Chooser
Private Input: y
Private Output: xy
Figure 2. Verifiable Oblivious Transfer
(b) P1 sends R to P2 and proves that K commits
to 2R + n.
(c) P2 computes K = A1 · . . . An ·B1 · · ·Bn
and checks that K = Commit(2R + n).
(d) If all verifications are successful, P2 outputs
T −R.
2nd Option: Run COT
(a) P2 computes C = Commit(T ) =
C1 · · ·Cn.
(b) P2 sends T to P1 and proves that C commits
to T.
(c) P1 computes C = C1 · · ·Cn and verifies the
proof.
(d) If all verifications are successful, P1 outputs
T −R.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF OUR
SCHEME
A cryptographic protocol is secure if the view of an
adversary in a real protocol execution can be generated
from the information the adversary has (i.e., its input
and output). In this section, we proved the security of
the proposed protocol by constructing a simulator, which
is given only the input and output of the “corrupted”
party, and generating a view that is indistinguishable from
the view of the adversary in a real protocol execution
[13, 14, 15, 16]. This implies that the adversary learns
no information from the real protocol because it could
generate anything from what it sees in such an execution
by itself.
Theorem 7.1
The proposed protocol, which is shown in Figure 3, is
secure in the presence of static malicious adversaries.
Proof
We show that given a party is corrupted, there exists a
simulator that can produce a view to the adversary that
is statistically indistinguishable from the view in the real
protocol execution based on its private decryption share as
well as public information.
Case-1-P1 is corrupted. Let AP1 be an adversary
corrupting P1. We construct a simulator SP1 and show that
the view of the adversary AP1 in the simulation with SP1
is statistically close to its view in a hybrid execution of
the protocol with a trusted party running the VOT (resp.
COT) protocol. Since we assume that the VOT (resp. COT)
protocol is secure, we analyze the security of the protocol
in the hybrid model with a trusted party computing the
VOT (resp. COT) functionality. Note that the simulator
SP1 knows X, skP1 for the 1
st option where VOT is run
(in the 2nd the simulator also knows dH(X,Y )). The
simulator proceeds as follows:
1. SP1 picks arbitrary Y˜ = y˜1 . . . y˜n and computes
˜CommitP2,i . SP1 can simulate the proofs since it
knows the committed input values y˜i’s and skP1 .
2. In case of VOT is run:
(a) SP1 first extracts the input of RP1 from VOT
functionality in the hybrid model, then sends
the input to the trusted party and learns the
output value t˜i.
(b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and computes
CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi as in the
real protocol.
In case of COT is run:
(a) SP1 first extracts the input ofRP1 from COT
functionality in the hybrid model, then sends
the input to the trusted party and learns the
output value t˜i and C˜i = Commit(t˜i) ∀i =
1, . . . , n.
(b) SP1 computes T˜ =
n∑
i=1
t˜i and Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i as in the real protocol.
(c) SP1 can simulate the proof since it knows the
committed input value T˜ ’s, dH(X,Y ) and
skP1 .
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript
is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the
verifier’s view when interacting with honest P2.
Case-2-P2 is corrupted. Let AP2 be an adversary
corrupting P2, we construct a simulator SP2 as follows.
Since we assume that the COT (resp. VOT) protocol is
secure, we analyze the security of the protocol in the hybrid
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P1 P2
X = x1 . . . xn, xi ∈ {0, 1}, skP1 Y = y1 . . . yn, yi ∈ {0, 1}, skP2
Compute CommitP2,i(yi) ∀i = 1 . . . n ∈R Z∗q
CommitP2,i (yi)+Prove that yi=0 or yi=1,∀i=1...n←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Pick r1, . . . , rn ∈R Zn+1
Compute R =
n∑
i=1
ri
Compute (ai, bi) = (ri + xi, ri + x˜i) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ai = CommitP1,i(ai) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Bi = CommitP1,i(bi) ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute Ri = CommitP1,i(ri) ∀i = 1 . . . n
<Ai,Bi,Ri+Prove that ((ai−ri)=0 or (bi−ri)=0) and |bi−ai=1|,∀i=1...n>−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1st Option:
<VOT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i (yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti where ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T =
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute K = CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi Compute CommitP2,i(2R + n) =
n∏
i=1
AiBi
R+Prove that K commits to (2R + n)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
2nd Option:
<COT((Ai,Bi);CommitP2,i (yi)):∀i=1...n>←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Obtain ti and Ci = Commit(ti) where
ti = ri + xi ⊕ yi ∀i = 1 . . . n
Compute T =
n∑
i=1
ti
Compute Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci Compute C = Commit(T ) =
n∏
i=1
Ci
T+Prove that C=Commit(T )←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
dH(X,Y ) = T −R
Figure 3. Our Improved Scheme
model with a trusted party computing the COT (resp.
VOT) functionality. Note that the simulator SP2 knows
Y = y1 . . . yn, skP2 and dH(X,Y ) for the 1
st option
where VOT is run (in the 2nd the simulator does not know
dH(X,Y )). The simulator proceeds as follows:
1. SP2 picks arbitrary X˜ = x˜1 . . . x˜n.
2. SP2 picks r˜i ∈R Z∗q and computes R˜P2 =
n∑
i=1
r˜i.
Next, SP2 computes (a˜i, b˜i) = (r˜i + x˜i, r˜i + x˜i)
∀i = 1 . . . n. SP2 computes A˜i, B˜i and R˜i as in
the real protocol. SP2 can again simulate the proofs
since he knows the committed input values and
skP2 .
3. In case VOT is run:
(a) SP2 first extracts the input of RP1 from
VOT functionality in the hybrid model and
then sends the input to the trusted party. SP2
next computes K˜ = CommitP2,i(2R˜ + n).
SP2 can simulate the proof since it knows
the committed input value R, dH(X,Y ) and
skP2 .
In case COT is run:
(a) SP2 first extracts the input of RP1 from
COT functionality in the hybrid model and
then sends the input to the trusted party
and learn Ci ∀i = 1, . . . , n. SP2 computes
Commit(T˜ ) =
n∏
i=1
C˜i.
Consequently, each step of the proposed authentication
protocol for the simulator is simulated and this completes
the simulation for the malicious verifier. The transcript
is consistent and statistically indistinguishable from the
verifier’s view when interacting with honest P1.
8. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF OUR
FIXED PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity
of our fixed protocol and compare it with the full scheme
of Bringer et al. [8]. In our protocol, the number of invoked
zero-knowledge proofs and multiplication of ciphertexts
remain the same. However, we improved the efficiency
of the protocol significantly by replacing n COTs with
n VOTs in the second option of the protocol where P2
computes the final Hamming distance. In this way, we
show that n commitments, 2n partial decryptions and 2n
ZK proofs can be removed. The number of commitments
of P1 is increased from 2n to 3n in order to guarantee the
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validity of P1’s inputs. This is the price that should be paid
to make the protocol secure. The complexity comparison
of the full scheme of Bringer et al. [8] and our fixed
protocol is illustrated in Figure I.
Scheme of
Bringer et al.
Our Fixed
Scheme
P1 P2 P1 P2
Commitments 2n n 3n n
ZK proofs n
OTs n COTs
1st opt: n COTs
2nd opt: n VOTs
Multiplication
of ciphertexts
1st opt: n
2nd opt: 2n
Table I. Complexity Comparison
Our analysis shows that the additional cost of the
security fix is only n commitments made by P1,
independent of the party which computes the final
Hamming distance. However, in the case that P2 computes
the final Hamming distance, the computational savings that
can be achieved by replacing the n COTs with n VOTs are
far larger. In general, a COT protocol requires one more
flow than a VOT protocol in which the chooser recommits
to its received value and proves that the new commitment
equals to her previous committed input. In particular, the
full scheme in [8] uses the COT scheme of [11] where
each run of a COT protocol requires one commitment, two
partial decryption of a ciphertext and two zero-knowledge
proofs in addition to a VOT protocol. As a result, we
avoid unnecessary use of two zero-knowledge proofs and
two partial decryptions. Consequently, we improve the
efficiency of the protocol significantly while we establish
the security of the protocol.
9. CONCLUSION
Bringer et al. [8] proposed two Hamming distance
computation schemes which can be applied to biometric
authentication systems. Their basic scheme is secure in
the semi-honest setting. However, their full protocol is not
sound in the malicious model.
In this paper, we show that the full scheme of Bringer
et al. [8] has an issue with respect to soundness. In our
attack, we show that an adversary without having any prior
knowledge can make the verifier compute an incorrect
Hamming distance. In the case of biometric authentication
systems, a malicious user can easily authenticate without
any information about the honest party. Namely, the
complexity of the security of the system is reduced from
O(2n) to O(n), where n is the input length. Moreover,
we fix the protocol by placing a robust method for
input validation without adding a significant cost. We
also enhance the efficiency of their protocol significantly
by showing that Verifiable Oblivious Transfer (VOT) is
sufficient to use instead of Committed Oblivious Transfer
(COT) in the second option of the full scheme. The
VOT reduction avoids the unnecessary computation of one
commitment, two zero-knowledge proofs and two partial
decryptions of the ciphertext for each bit of the input.
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